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SUMMARY
Faced with rising fiscal pressures and discontent over income inequality, many countries, Canada
among them, are searching for remedies. Income tax systems offer an effective way of changing
economic destinies, so it’s only natural for governments to regard tax policy as a panacea. The first step
to a solution is to understand how income tax influences existing inequality. This paper provides an
overview of trends in pre- and post-tax income distribution in Canada from 1980-2005, by drawing on
a more comprehensive data source than those found in many existing studies — Canadian census data.
The results are in broad agreement: money has been steadily accumulating in the top half of the income
distribution since 1980, with the trend quickening after 1995. This is just as true for family after-tax
incomes as it is for individual market incomes even after the impact of the income tax system is taken
into account. Over the 25-year period studied, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.352 to 0.404 for pre-tax
income, and from 0.312 to 0.349 for after-tax income, while the proportion of the increase undone by
taxation fell to a low of 2 per cent after 1995, as the Canadian tax system became less redistributive.
However, some progressive aspects remain. Improvements to refundable tax credits in the late 1990s
led to a 20 per cent decline in the number of families falling under the Low-Income Cut-Off. Canada’s
income tax system hasn’t kept pace with climbing pre-tax inequality, but it continues to be a useful after-
tax equalizer for low-income families. 
† The author wishes to thank the participants in the Symposium in Tax and Economic Growth held in
Calgary in November 2012 for helpful comments. In particular, Rhys Kesselman provided thoughtful
feedback as the discussant. Finally, the anonymous referees gave useful advice and are thanked.    
INTRODUCTION
A renewed interest in income distribution has emerged at a time when many countries are facing
serious fiscal pressures, with large deficits projected into the future. Countries such as the
United States and the United Kingdom are tangling with the question of how to raise new
revenues and from whom those revenues should come. In Canada, the fiscal pressures (at least
at the federal level) are less acute as our federal deficit is smaller than other countries’ as a
percentage of national income. For Canada, this means that raising new revenues is more a
matter of choice than necessity.
While the fiscal pressure for change may be different in Canada, recent research on inequality
has suggested that many of the trends in income inequality observed in the United States also
manifest in Canada. In particular, Saez and Veall,1 Murphy, Roberts, and Wolfson,2 and Veall3
have documented the rise in the concentration of income at the very top of the income
distribution — in the top one per cent of income earners. Fortin et al.4 and Veall5 have begun a
discussion of the sources of this rise in inequality and ways that it might be addressed.
In some ways, this focus on the top part of the income distribution is not strongly tethered to the
more traditional measures of income distribution, which consider all parts of the distribution at
once. In part, this reflects the administrative tax data sources (drawn directly from tax returns)
being used in the recent literature. While there are many advantages to administrative tax data,
these data may do a poor job of recording incomes at the bottom of the income distribution
because of non-reporting and misreporting among those who do file their taxes. Frenette, Green
and Milligan6 argue that for many purposes, census data may perform better than administrative
data — in particular in capturing the incomes of those closer to the bottom of the income
distribution.
In this paper, I use data from the Canadian census to investigate the trends in income inequality
over the 25-year span from 1981 to 2006. A particular focus is placed on the contributions of the
income tax system to understanding the trends in income inequality in Canada. The income tax
system is one of the primary tools available to a government to change the distribution of
wellbeing. The goal of the paper is to document and explain the trends in pre- and post-tax
income inequality in Canada.
1 Saez, Emmanuel and Michael R. Veall (2005), “The evolution of high incomes in Northern America: Lessons from
Canadian Evidence,” American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 831-849.
2 Murphy, Brian, Paul Roberts, and Michael Wolfson (2007), “A Profile of High-Income Canadians,” Income Research
Paper Series, Catalogue No. 75F0002MIE, No. 6. Statistics Canada.
3 Veall, Michael (2010), “Top income shares in Canada: Updates and Extensions,” Manuscript, McMaster University. 
4 Fortin, Nicole, David Green, Thomas Lemieux, Kevin Milligan, and Craig Riddell (2012), “Canadian Inequality:
Recent Developments and Policy Options,” Canadian Public Policy, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 121-145.
5 Veall, Michael R. (2012), “Top income shares in Canada: Recent trends and policy implications,” Canadian Journal of
Economics, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 1247-1272. 
6 Frenette, Marc, David Green, and Kevin Milligan (2007), “The tale of the tails: Canadian income inequality in the
1980s and 1990s,” Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 734-764.
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I make three contributions with this work. First, I build on the previous inequality research
using the census by adding an analysis of top incomes to complement the more traditional
income inequality measures. This brings together the entire distribution measures and the high-
income measures in an analysis using one source of data. Second, I extend the growing
literature on high-income concentration by examining the trends in a large survey data source
— this contrasts with and complements the administrative data typically used in that literature.
Third, I explore policy simulations that seek to determine what contributions the income tax
system has made in shaping the observed trends in after-tax income inequality.
There are several findings of interest about the trends in income distribution. As other
researchers have shown, I find a large increase in inequality in the top half of the income
distribution in Canada since 1980, and in particular since 1995. The share of income going to
those at the top of the distribution has grown markedly since 1995, and this occurs not just for
individual market incomes, but also family after-tax incomes. Finally, by many measures,
inequality in the bottom half of the income distribution has diminished.
On the tax policy front, I present several new results. The evidence shows that very little of the
increase in pre-tax income inequality at the top of the income distribution has been reversed by
the income tax system, meaning that most of the pre-tax increase has fed through to after-tax
incomes. The impact of the tax system shines through in the bottom half of the income
distribution, narrowing the gap between those close to the bottom and those at the middle.
Specifically, the simulations suggest that the expansion of refundable tax credits has been a major
contributor to improving the incomes of those closer to the bottom of the income distribution.
In the next section, I discuss several measurement issues concerning both the measurement
index of wellbeing and different available measures to gauge inequality. I then provide a
detailed description of the census and outline its advantages and disadvantages relative to
administrative tax data. Following that, I lay out how I form my dataset and variables for
analysis and begin an exploration of the results. I show results for comprehensive income
measures, followed by the top incomes analysis, all on a before- and after-tax basis. Finally, I
use simulations of the tax systems across different years and provinces to look for the policy
sources driving some of the findings in the main analysis.
MEASUREMENT
The ultimate target of the study of inequality is to understand how economic wellbeing is
distributed; on this target, there is much agreement. However, measuring economic wellbeing is
controversial. The controversy spans both what index of wellbeing ought to be measured, and
also how to summarize inequality using the chosen index. As well, as pointed out by Richardson,7
judgments about what part of the income distribution is important are necessarily subjective,
meaning that different people may reasonably want to focus on different measures. Below, I first
discuss different indexes of wellbeing, then different ways to measure the chosen index.
7 Richardson, Stephen R. (2012), “Some observations on the concept and measurement of income inequality,”
University of Calgary School of Public Policy Communique, Volume 4, Issue 1.
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3Which index of wellbeing?
Candidate measures for an index of wellbeing include wealth, permanent or lifetime income,
consumption, and period (e.g., annual) income. One consideration governing this choice of
measure is theory and how well theory holds in practice. If individuals can perfectly insure
against permanent and transitory income shocks, then period income should not affect
wellbeing — consumption should reflect insured permanent income and non-bequest wealth. In
this case, we shouldn’t care about period income; wealth, permanent income and consumption
should provide very similar answers. Some evidence (e.g., Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston8)
suggests that insurance is incomplete — and more strongly so for those at lower education
levels. If so, this would open the door to putting some weight on consideration of period
income inequality. That is, if lower income individuals cannot easily smooth their consumption
across periods when they may have low income, concern about even temporary periods of low
income should increase.
Another key factor for the choice of wellbeing measure is data availability. Wealth is difficult
to value because of the specificity of untraded assets, and the difficulties in valuing flows of
income such as future pension annuities. Consumption measurement requires the tricky
valuation of flows from durables (especially housing) and non-market items like public goods.
Lifetime income requires estimation and projection of incomes into the future which are not
yet observed. A broad and complete measure of period income would also face challenges
capturing changes in the values of assets, as untraded assets must be measured both at the
beginning and end of the period to obtain the (possibly unrealized) capital gain. Moreover,
income derived from assets in tax-preferred forms such as housing or special retirement
accounts will not be recorded easily. In short, no measure is perfect, but necessarily imperfect
attempts using different measures can complement each other by contributing to a more
complete picture.
In this ongoing debate about measurement, the fact that so much of the evolution of inequality
seems to be driven at the top of the distribution has important implications. Consumption
measurement typically comes from expenditure surveys, and these expenditure surveys don’t
tend to have large samples of those at the top of the distribution. Recent evidence suggests
there is greater non-response and poorer quality responses among those at the very top of the
income distribution for the US Consumer Expenditure Survey.9 In contrast, income data from
large surveys (such as the census) and administrative sources (like tax data) will not suffer
from small samples and may not be as susceptible to mismeasurement.  
8 Blundell, Richard, Luigi Pistaferri, and Ian Preston (2008), “Consumption inequality and partial insurance,”
American Economic Review, Vol. 98, No. 5, pp. 1887-1921.
9 Sabelhaus et al. (Sabelhaus, John, David Johnson, Stephen Ash, David Swanson, Thesia Garner, John Greenlees, and
Steve Henderson (forthcoming), “Is the Consumer Expenditure Survey representative by income?” in Christopher
Carroll, Thomas Crossley, and John Sabelhaus (eds.) Improving the Measurement of Consumer Expenditures.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.) examine the behaviour of high-income CE responders compared to zip code-
level income data, finding higher non-response and underreported expenditure among those with the highest income. 
Barrett, Levell, and Milligan (Barrett Garry, Peter Levell, Kevin Milligan (forthcoming), “A Comparison of micro
and macro expenditure measures across countries using differing survey methods,” in Christopher Carroll, Thomas
Crossley, and John Sabelhaus (eds.) Improving the Measurement of Consumer Expenditures. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.) show that the proportion of national account aggregate expenditure that can be accounted for by
survey expenditure data is decreasing in the share of income going to the top one per cent across Australia, Canada,
the UK, and the US. 
In this paper, I will use an annual measure of income.10 I present the results both for
individuals and for economic families. For the family analysis, I show both ‘unadjusted’ results
that simply add income across family members and ‘adjusted’ results that use a square root
divisor to adjust income to a per-capita equivalent. This is an advantage over tax data, which
have limited information on living arrangements and therefore do not permit the construction
of economic families. I show some results using a market-income measure that excludes
government transfers, but I focus most attention on a comprehensive income measure that
accords with pre-tax income as defined by the tax system. I make this choice because this is
the measure of income most easily affected by policy. I also show results for after-tax measures
both gross and net of the refundable tax credits that are an important part of the income tax in
Canada.
One shortcoming of using an annual measure is the inability to address the important topic of
income mobility. Those who are in a lower income position in one year may not stay there
long. As emphasized above, when insurance is incomplete, even a short spell of lower income
may have large welfare consequences if people cannot adequately compensate. Morissette and
Ostrovsky11 provide a recent analysis of income mobility over five-year periods in Canada,
finding that instability in the bottom part of the distribution is the norm, and that the tax and
transfer system does moderate the impact of this instability on after-tax incomes. Bibi, Duclos,
and Araar12 emphasize that the flipside of mobility is instability across years, and that
instability reduces welfare. Corak13 compares the level of income inequality and the degree of
inter-generational (father-to-son) income mobility across countries and finds a strong
relationship. Countries with lower period income inequality tend to have much stronger inter-
generational mobility. It is noteworthy that this inter-generational correlation in Canada is
around 0.19 but 0.47 in the United States,14 so by this measure, Canadian society is much more
economically mobile across generations. 
10 For recent analyses using other approaches, please see Norris and Pendakur (Norris, Sam and Krishna Pendakur
(2012), “Imputing Rent in Consumption Measures with an Application to Poverty in Canada, 1997-2009,” Canadian
Journal of Economics, forthcoming) who use consumption, Beach, Finnie, and Gray (Beach, Charles M., Ross
Finnie, and David Gray (2010), “Long-Run Inequality and Short-Run Instability of Men’s and Women’s Earnings in
Canada,” Review of Income and Wealth, Series 56, No. 3, September) who look at short- and long-run earnings
inequality, and Milligan (Milligan, Kevin (2005), “Lifecycle Asset Accumulation and Allocation in Canada,”
Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 1057-1106) for an examination of wealth inequality.
11 Morissette, René and Yuri Ostrovsky (2005), “The Instability of Family Earnings and Family Income in Canada,
1986-1991 and 1996-2001,” Canadian Public Policy, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 273-302.
12 Bibi, Sami, Jean-Yves Duclos, and Abdelkrim Araar (forthcoming), “Mobility, Taxation, and Welfare,” Social Choice
and Welfare.
13 Corak, Miles (2012), “Inequality from Generation to Generation: The United States in Comparison,” in Robert
Rycroft (ed.) The Economics of Inequality, Poverty, and Discrimination in the 21st Century, ABC-CLIO,
forthcoming.
14 Ibid.
4
How to summarize the distribution of wellbeing?
Methods to summarize a distribution are plentiful and I do not aim for a comprehensive review
here.15 Instead, I attempt to pick some measures that shed light on different parts of the income
distribution. The measures I use can uncover changes at all points of the income distribution, in
contrast to the high-income literature which focuses only at the top.
The most comprehensive measure I employ is the Gini coefficient. This measure captures the
difference between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line.16 If incomes were completely
equally distributed, the Gini coefficient would take the value 0; if the top person had all the
income it would take the value 1. The advantage of the coefficient is its ability to summarize
the entire distribution and its comparability across countries and time. However, the coefficient
is not as useful in picking out where in the distribution changes are most acute.
A second general measure I employ is the ratio of income decile cut-offs. For example, the
ratio of the income determining the 90th and the 10th percentile of the distribution is useful for
observing what is going on near the top and near the bottom of the distribution. Burkhauser,
Feng, and Jenkins17 explain that this measure originated in the analysis of data that was top-
coded or otherwise noisily measured in the tails. In addition to the 90-10 ratio, I also report
some results for the 90-50 and the 50-10 ratios, which compare the income cut-off for the 90th
percentile to the median and the median to the 10th percentile. These comparisons attempt to
elicit whether observed 90-10 changes are driven by the top or bottom half of the distribution.
In what follows, I implement decile ratios by taking the log of the given ratio in order to
facilitate interpretation of the ratios in terms of percentage changes. A challenge for these
measures is the volatility of some incomes at the low end of the income distribution. It is not
unusual for individuals to have no income at all, and among those who do have income, the
sources tend to be more varied, which introduces measurement issues.
The third type of measure I use is top income shares. The proportion of total income received
by someone above a certain percentile cut-off is compared through time. Atkinson18 provides a
motivation for the use of these top share measures, and Leigh19 reconciles their use with more
traditional income distribution measures. As argued by Atkinson, in a standard Lorenz curve
diagram, the top one per cent is barely perceptible against the right-hand axis, yet that one per
cent accounts for a large part of the movements in the income distribution over the past 30
years. This motivates the use of top income share measures that do a better job of highlighting
these movements at the top. 
15 See the classic treatment by Atkinson (Atkinson, A. B. (1975), Economics of Inequality. Oxford University Press) or
the recent review in Cowell (Cowell, Frank A. (2011) Measuring Inequality (third edition), Oxford University Press,
Oxford) for a more comprehensive discussion.
16 A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative proportion of income against the cumulative proportion of people. The more
this curve bends away from the diagonal 45-degree line, the more unequal is the distribution of income.
17 Burkhauser, Richard V., Shuaizhang Feng, and Stephen P. Jenkins (2009), “Using the P90/P10 index to measure US
inequality trends with Current Population Survey data: A view from inside the Census Bureau vaults,” Review of
Income and Wealth, Vol. 55, No. 1, March.
18 Atkinson, A. B. (2007), “Measuring Top Incomes: Methodological Issues,” in Atkinson and Piketty (eds.) Top
Incomes over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast Between European and English-Speaking Countries. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
19 Leigh, Andrew (2007) “How Closely do Top Income Shares Track Other Measures of Inequality?” Economic
Journal, Vol. 117, issue 524, pp. F619–F633
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Finally, I employ some measures of low income in order to draw out changes at the bottom of
the distribution. I use both the Low-Income Measure (LIM) and the Low-Income Cut-off
(LICO).20 The LIM sets an annual cut-off at half the median of ‘adjusted’ household income
and counts the proportion of households lying under that cut-off. In contrast, the LICO
compares incomes at the family level to a cut-off set in 1992 and updated only for inflation. In
this way, LIM is a relative measure of low income and the LICO is an absolute measure.
DATA
In this section I discuss the data employed for the analysis presented in this paper. Many recent
papers have used administrative tax data to analyze income distribution. In contrast, I use the
Canadian census. I start by describing the census in detail and comparing its advantages to
administrative tax data. Following the discussion of the attributes of the census, I provide
details on how I selected the sample I use for the analysis and how I formed the key variables.
The long-form census
The features of the census that make it suitable for the analysis of incomes come out of the
details of sampling and survey content. I provide this detail here, taking care to compare how
the census fares against the alternative administrative tax data source.21
I use data from Form 2B of the Canadian census (the ‘long form’). The long form was first
implemented for the 1971 census.22 In that year, Form 2B was distributed to one-third of
Canadian households, with the balance of households receiving Form 2A (the ‘short form’). In
1981, the proportion receiving the long form was changed to one-fifth. As implied by the
names, the short form asked a limited number of rudimentary demographic questions about the
people in the household: age, sex, and living arrangements. The long form requested detailed
information on ethnicity, immigration, language, labour-market activity, housing, and income,
although there were some differences in content over the years. Only basic information on
those under age 15 is provided; income information for example is only available for those
aged 15 and older. For the purposes of this paper, it is the income information that makes the
long-form census feasible for the analysis.
The census (including the long form) was conducted quinquennially from 1971 to 2006; the
long form was discontinued for 2011 and replaced with the National Household Survey. The
census targets all Canadian citizens and landed immigrants with a residence in Canada, those 
20 Statistics Canada (2012, “Low Income Lines, 2010 to 2011,” Income Research Paper Series, Catalogue No.
75F0002M) lays out the methodology for both the LIM and the LICO.
21 The source documents from which I gather this information are the Census Handbook and Dictionary for each year.
For example, the 2001 census documents can be found in Statistics Canada 2003a, “2001 Census Dictionary.”
Census Operations Division, Catalogue No. 92-378-XIE; 2003b, “2001 Census Handbook.” Census Operations
Division, Catalogue No. 92-379-XIE; and 2003c, “Sampling and Weighting Report, 2001 Census Technical Report.”
Census Operations Division, Catalogue No. 92-395-XIE.
22 An antecedent to the long form was conducted as part of the census in 1961. A population sample questionnaire was
presented in that year with questions on migration, fertility, and income.
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who are at sea or in port on a Canadian-registered vessel, as well as non-permanent residents
currently living in Canada.23 A list of all dwellings is drawn up for around 40,000
‘Enumeration Areas,’ ranging in extent from about 175 dwellings in rural areas to around 600
dwellings in urban areas. At this enumeration-area level, one-fifth of dwellings are selected for
the long form.24 The census is a point-in-time picture, focused on a particular day (typically in
May or June). However, the income questions pertain to the previous calendar (and tax) year,
so the precise timing of the census is not important for my purposes.
While all collective dwellings receive the long form, residents of certain types of institutional
dwellings (such as inmates in jails, patients in homes for the elderly, or children in orphanages)
are not asked to fill in the questionnaire. Beyond the institutionalized population, collective
dwellings also include places like hotels, work camps, campgrounds, and Hutterite colonies.
These non-institutionalized collective dwelling residents do receive the long form. Collective
dwellings are potentially important as many measures of inequality utilize family-income
concepts that may necessitate dropping those living in collective dwellings. I make clear how I
deal with these decisions below.
Response rates for the long-form census as a whole were very high. For example, in 2006, non-
response was about six per cent of households. However, item non-response for income
questions is around 20 per cent. Item non-response for income was dealt with through editing
and imputation. For example, non-response to the question on pension income for younger
people might be re-coded as a zero during editing.
The source and structure of the long-form census data on income have evolved through time.
For the years from 1971 to 2001 (except 1976 when income information was not gathered), the
source was a set of survey questions on income. For the 2006 censuses, respondents were
offered the choice of having their tax records matched with the census, obviating the need to
fill in the census income questions — and 82.4 per cent of respondents took up this option.25
The quality of the census income data has been assessed in a number of studies by comparing
them against other sources. For the 2006 census, Olson and Maser26 find the census provides
data that are quite close when aggregated to the national level, when compared to either tax or
national accounts data. Frenette, Green, and Picot27 find that the census data do well in the
bottom part of the income distribution.
23 These non-permanent residents were added to the focus of the census in 1991.
24 Some dwellings are always given the long form: collective dwellings and those who are enumerated by a census
employee rather than filling in the form themselves. Those evaluated by a census employee tend to be on Indian
reserves, remote areas, or targeted urban areas.
25 Statistics Canada (2008, “Income and earnings reference guide, 2006 Census,” Catalogue no. 97-563- GWE200603)
shows that the change to tax record matching resulted in less ‘heaping’ at round numbers. Billette, Brochu, and
Morin (Billette, Jean-Michel, Pierre Brochu, and Louis-Philippe Morin (2012), “Who does not share their tax
information? And its implication for Income Inequality,” manuscript, University of Ottawa) study who does and does
not opt to share the tax information with the census in 2006. 
26 Olsen, Eric and Karen Maser (2010), “Comparing Income Statistics from Different Sources: Aggregate Income,
2005,” Catalogue 75F0002MWE2010002, Statistics Canada.
27 Frenette, Marc, David Green, and Garnett Picot (2004), “Rising Income Inequality in the 1990s: An Exploration of
Three Data Sources,” Analytical Studies Branch research paper No. 219. Catalogue No. 11F0019MIE, Statistics
Canada.
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The census uses a different income concept than the tax system.28 This is an advantage, to the
extent that items that may be part of a broad income definition are missed by the tax system.
As one example, scholarship income was partly excludable during the time period under study
here, and the excluded portion would not be reported to tax authorities. Of greater import, non-
taxable income such as the Guaranteed Income Supplement and provincial social assistance
were not required to be reported on the tax form until 1992. These income items are very
important to those at the lower part of the income distribution. On the other hand, the
definition of income is not uniformly broader. For example, capital gains income is entirely
ignored in the census.
Census versus tax data
There are several main advantages of the census for the analysis presented in this paper. First,
the large samples are helpful because of the availability of large amounts of data even in the
tails of the income distribution. Second, the income information seems to perform well in
analyses comparing it to tax data and national account aggregates. Third, the census does not
rely on tax filing to be in the sample.29 Fourth, the concept of income is arguably broader than
what is captured by tax data. Finally, the census allows one to analyze on the basis of an
individual, family, or household. Tax data require the analyst to reconstruct living arrangements
based only on what information is provided to the tax authority.
Tax data do have several advantages as well. First, there is no problem with respondent recall
as the data come directly from the administrative source. Second, penalties for misreporting
give a financial incentive to report accurately — although this factor is counterbalanced by the
financial incentive people have to underreport income.30 Third, annual longitudinal analysis is
possible with tax data, but not with the quinquennial census.
One major difference between the census and the tax data is the measurement of taxes.
Administrative data drawn from income tax records have exact information on taxes. In
contrast, the census did not collect information on income taxes before 2006. For those years
before 2006, I must impute tax information to the households using the income reported in the
census. I describe this procedure in the next section.
28 Statistics Canada (2008) op. cit. describes in detail the census concept of income.
29 Abraham et al. (Abraham, Elizabeth, Maud Rivard, Philip Giles, and Heather Lathe (2001), “Results of the Tax
Permission Question in the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics,” Income Statistics Division, Statistics Canada.
Catalogue No. 75 F0002MIE-01002) find that non-filers come heavily from the bottom quintile of the income
distribution. In that bottom quintile, 13 per cent are non-filers. This compares to 1.1 per cent in the 2nd lowest
quintile, and 0.1 to 0.2 per cent in the other three quintiles.
30 Hurst, Li, and Pugsley (2012) compare underreporting of self-employment income in surveys to the well-documented
underreporting in tax data, finding that self-employment income is also underreported in surveys.
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As there are advantages to each approach, the results from the census complement those from
the tax data. Burkhauser et al.31 perform such a comparison as they reconcile the trends in top
income shares using the March Current Population Survey and IRS tax-return data for the
United States. In Canada, to date, there has not been an analysis of top income shares using
census data, although broader inequality measures are analyzed in the census by Frenette,
Green, and Milligan.32
Data selection and manipulation
I describe here how I select the dataset I use for the analysis, and provide some detail on how I
prepare the census data for the tax calculations.
I use the versions of the census that are available in Research Data Centres. To date, the data
from the 1981 through 2006 censuses are available. The censuses previous to 1981 will
become available through the Research Data Centres in time, so it may be possible in the
future to extend this work further back when the 1971 data become available.
The sample selection criteria I impose on the census data arise from two aspects of the
analysis. First, since I want to calculate tax liabilities for each person in the census, I need to
have enough information on the family structure to implement the tax calculations. Since an
individual’s tax liability depends on children (through refundable and non-refundable tax
credits) and the presence of a spouse or common-law partner (through spousal credits and
pooled income for refundable credit calculations), it is necessary to have information on
children and spouses. Second, I want to aggregate incomes into families and households. Both
the tax calculation and the aggregation mean that collective dwellings present problems, since
detailed family relationships for those in collective households are not provided and the
households can be of very large size.33 For this reason, I exclude those living in collective
dwellings for parts of the analysis.
While excluding those in collective dwellings may not seem consequential, an analysis of the
incomes of those in collective dwellings reveals these individuals to have lower incomes than
average. Given that the proportion of census individuals in collective dwellings is between two
and three per cent in the census years I consider, this exclusion may be non-trivial for some
types of income-inequality calculations. While I cannot include these residents of collective
dwelling in any of the household or family calculations, I do include them for some individual
income calculations to check the sensitivity of the analysis to this exclusion.34
31 Burkhauser, Richard V., Shuaizhang Feng, Stephen P. Jenkins, and Jeff Larrimore (2012), “Recent trends in top
income shares in the United States: Reconciling estimates from March CPS and IRS tax return data,” The Review of
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 94, No. 2, pp. 371-388.
32 Frenette, Green, and Milligan (2007) op. cit. 
33 Among the types of collective dwellings, there is one exception for information about family relations: Hutterite
colonies. The census does provide information on the family relations of those in Hutterite colonies. While this
would permit the calculation of tax liabilities, the size of these collective households makes the aggregated household
incomes noticeably different from other households. For this reason, I exclude those dwelling in Hutterite colonies.
34 Because of problems with income reporting, the incomes of those in Hutterite colonies are given as zero for all
census years from 1981 to 2006, so the analysis including collective households excludes Hutterites. 
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I use the census variables on family relationships to form the ‘tax family’ that is put through
the tax calculator. I can observe those who are married or in a common-law relationship who
are residing together. I combine this information to form couples. I can also match each child
in the data to the family in which the child lives. I attach the age of each child to the parent
couple or single parent. For the tax calculations, I consider only children ages 0 to 17. Older
children are kept in the analysis, but are each placed in their own ‘tax family’ rather than with
their parents.35
Individual information is used for some of the analysis. I also aggregate these individuals into
families and households for parts of the analysis. The family concept I employ for this
aggregation is the economic family, which comprises people living together in the same
dwelling who are related by blood, marriage, common law, or adoption. The economic family
is the standard setting for the analysis of wellbeing. I use the household only for the calculation
the Low-Income Measure, which recently changed to using the household instead of the
economic family.36
I use three different measures of income for the analysis. Because the focus of the paper is on
the income tax system, I target measures that are informative about the functioning of the
income tax system. The first is a standard measure of market income, including income from
employment, self-employment, investment, and pensions. The concept here is one of ‘pre-fisc’
income, excluding the impact of taxes and government sources of income. While it has no direct
analogue in the tax system, it is useful to benchmark against other papers that have used this
income concept. The second concept I use is total income, for which I aim to recreate as best as
possible in the census the total income measure (line 150) of the income tax. Finally, I use after-
tax income defined as total income less provincial and federal income taxes (including
contributions to Canada / Quebec Pension Plan and Employment Insurance, provincial health
premiums, and other tax measures implemented through the income tax system not including
sales taxes). I further break the after-tax income measure into two different measures for some
of the analysis: one that accounts for refundable tax credits (like the GST tax credit, the Canada
Child Tax Benefit, and other similar credits) and one that does not.
It is important to emphasize the differences between these measures. Some analysts prefer to
compare market income to after-tax income in order to examine the entire impact of
government on incomes — not just the income tax system but also transfers such as
unemployment insurance, public pensions, and social assistance. While I do perform some
analysis of market income, the bulk of the analysis in this paper compares total income
(including government transfer income) to after-tax income. This limits the scope of the paper
to the impact of the income tax system. However, for high-income individuals, on whom much
focus is given in recent inequality research, the importance of government transfers is minimal.
For these people, the distinction between market income and total income is not important.
35 For the formation of ‘tax families’ I rely primarily on the information provided in the census on the composition and
relationships of what Statistics Canada calls the ‘census family.’ A census family is, roughly, parents living together
with their children. If the children are married or have children of their own, they become their own census family.
This definition is very similar to that used by the income tax system.
36 This switch for the Low-Income Measure from the economic family to the household was made in order to conform
with international norms. When both the economic family and household are available, it is not clear why one would
prefer to use the household to measure wellbeing, since the household may contain economically unrelated people.
See Murphy, Brian, X. Zhang and C. Dionne. (2010) “Revising Statistics Canada’s Low-Income Measures,”
Statistics Canada, Income Research Paper Series. 75F0002MIE.
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In order to undertake the tax calculations, I must find a way to take the 11 categories (nine in
1981) of income reported in the census and translate them into income categories as defined by
the income tax system. I report how this is done in Table 1. The tax calculator I employ is
called the Canadian Tax and Credit Simulator (CTaCS). It is described in detail in Milligan.37
CTaCS takes as input the income in different categories corresponding to the tax form, along
with age, family structure, and province. CTaCS takes this information and returns the tax
liability, including all refundable tax credits. Importantly, I also impute amounts for certain
deduction and credit categories which serves to reduce taxable income and tax paid.38
TABLE 1: INCOME DEFINITION IN THE CENSUS
37 Milligan, Kevin (2012), Canadian Tax and Credit Simulator. Database, software and documentation. Version 2012-1.
38 These imputations are based on information from Tax Statistics on Individuals published by the Canada Revenue
Agency. This information is available for cells defined by province, year, and narrow-income groups. I impute
amounts to each cell and a probability that there is any amount based on the CRA data. The imputed amounts are for
donations and gifts, RRSP contributions, RPP contributions, union dues, childcare expenses, other deductions, and
additional deductions from net income.
Census ItemDefinition from 2001 Census Dictionary (Statistics Canada 2003)   How treated
Wages and
salaries
Net non-farm
self-employment
income
Net farm self-
employment
income
Family
allowances /
child benefits
Gross wages and salaries before deductions for such items as income tax,
pensions and Employment Insurance. Included in this source are military pay and
allowances, tips, commissions and cash bonuses, benefits from wage-loss
replacement plans or income-maintenance insurance plans, as well as all types
of casual earnings during calendar year 2000. The value of taxable allowances
and benefits provided by employers, such as free lodging and free automobile
use, is excluded.
Net income (gross receipts minus expenses of operation such as wages, rents and
depreciation) received during calendar year 2000 from the respondent’s non-farm
unincorporated business or professional practice. In the case of partnerships, only
the respondent’s share was reported. Also included is net income from persons
babysitting in their own homes, persons providing room and board to non-relatives,
self-employed fishers, hunters and trappers, operators of direct distributorships
(such as those selling and delivering cosmetics), as well as freelance activities of
artists, writers, music teachers, hairdressers, dressmakers, etc.
Net income (gross receipts from farm sales minus depreciation and cost of
operation) received from the operation of a farm, either on the respondent’s own
account or in partnership. In the case of partnerships, only the respondent’s share
of income was reported. Included with gross receipts are cash advances received in
2000, dividends from cooperatives, rebates and farm-support payments to farmers
from federal, provincial and regional agricultural programs (e.g. milk subsidies and
marketing board payments) and gross insurance proceeds such as payments from
the Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA). The value of income ‘in kind,’ such as
agricultural products produced and consumed on the farm, is excluded.
Payments received under the Canada Child Tax Benefit program during calendar
year 2000 by eligible parents with dependent children under 18 years of age. No
information on these benefits was collected from respondents. Instead, these
were calculated and assigned, where applicable, to one of the parents in the
census family on the basis of information on children in the family and the family
income. Included with the Canada Child Tax Benefit is the National Child Benefit
Supplement (NCBS) for low-income families with children. The NCBS is the
federal contribution to the National Child Benefit (NCB), a joint initiative of
federal, provincial and territorial governments. Also included under this program
are child benefits and earned income supplements provided by certain provinces
and territories.
Fully allocated to CTaCS
variable earn, corresponding
to line 101 of the T1 tax form. 
Fully allocated to CTaCS
variable self, corresponding to
lines 135, 137, 139 or 143.
Fully allocated to CTaCS
variable self, corresponding to
line 141.
This is not included. Instead,
I impute child benefits based
on reported income for the
year. For the 1981, 1986,
and 1991 census, I impute
(taxable) family allowance. 
TABLE 1: INCOME DEFINITION IN THE CENSUS (cont’d)
12
Census ItemDefinition from 2001 Census Dictionary (Statistics Canada 2003)   How treated
Old Age Security
/ GIS /
Allowance
Canada/
Quebec Pension
Plan benefits
(Un)Employment
Insurance
benefits
Other income
from
government
sources
Interest and
dividends
Retirement
pensions,
superannuation,
and annuities
Other money
income
Old Age Security pensions and Guaranteed Income Supplements paid to persons
65 years of age and over, and to the Allowance or Allowance for the survivor paid
to 60- to 64-year-old spouses of old age security recipients or widow(er)s by the
federal government. (Combined with CPP/QPP income in 1981)
Benefits received during calendar year 2000 from the Canada or Quebec Pension
Plan (e.g. retirement pensions, survivors. benefits and disability pensions). Does
not include lump-sum death benefits.
Total Employment Insurance benefits received during calendar year 2000, before
income tax deductions. It includes benefits for unemployment, sickness,
maternity, paternity, adoption, work sharing, retraining and benefits to self-
employed fishers received under the federal Employment Insurance Program.
All transfer payments, excluding those covered as a separate income source
(Canada Child Tax Benefits, Old Age Security pensions and Guaranteed Income
Supplements, Canada or Quebec Pension Plan benefits and Employment
Insurance benefits) received from federal, provincial or municipal programs during
the calendar year 2000. This source includes social assistance payments
received by persons in need, such as mothers with dependent children, persons
temporarily or permanently unable to work, elderly individuals, the blind and
persons with disabilities. Included are provincial income supplement payments to
seniors and provincial payments to help offset accommodation costs. Also
included are other transfer payments, such as payments received from training
programs sponsored by the federal and provincial governments, regular payments
from provincial automobile insurance plans, veterans pensions, war veterans
allowance, pensions to widows and dependants of veterans, and workers
compensation. Additionally, refundable provincial tax credits, the Alberta Energy
Tax Refund and refunds of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), Harmonized Sales
Tax (HST) or Quebec Sales Tax (QST) received in 2000 are included.
Deposits in banks, trust companies, cooperatives, credit unions, caisses
populaires, etc., as well as interest on savings certificates, bonds and
debentures, and all dividends from both Canadian and foreign corporate stocks
and mutual funds. Also included is other investment income from either Canadian
or foreign sources, such as net rents from real estate, mortgage and loan interest
received, regular income from an estate or trust fund, and interest from insurance
policies.
All regular income received by the respondent during calendar year 2000 as the
result of having been a member of a pension plan of one or more employers. It
includes payments received from all annuities, including payments from a
matured Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) in the form of a life annuity,
a fixed-term annuity, a Registered Retirement Income Fund (RRIF) or an income-
averaging annuity contract; pensions paid to widow(er)s or other relatives of
deceased pensioners; pensions of retired civil servants, Armed Forces personnel
and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers; annuity payments received
from the Canadian Government Annuities Fund, an insurance company, etc. Does
not include lump-sum death benefits, lump-sum benefits or withdrawals from a
pension plan or RRSP, or refunds of over-contributions.
Regular cash income received during calendar year 2000 and not reported in any
of the other nine sources listed on the questionnaire. For example, alimony, child
support, periodic support from other persons not in the household, income from
abroad (excluding dividends and interest), non-refundable scholarships and
bursaries, severance pay and royalties are included. (Combined with retirement
income for 1981.)
This is split between the CTaCS
variables oasinc and
gisspainc. I impute the OAS
given age, and allocate the
rest to GIS/SPA. If higher
income, I assume it is all OAS.
This corresponds to lines 113
and 146 of the tax form.
CTaCS variable cqpinc
corresponding to line 114 For
1981, this is split from OAS
and GIS and Allowance.
CTaCS variable uiinc.
Corresponding to line 119.
This variable is included as
Social Assistance income,
CTaCS variable sainc. This
corresponds to line 145. The
tax treatment of social
assistance income is identical
to workers’ compensation
income. Social assistance and
workers’ compensation are the
two most empirically relevant
components here. Imputed
values for GST, HST, and QST
refundable credits are
subtracted off to avoid double
counting. 
This amount is allocated
between CTaCS variables
dvdinc and intinc. It is split
between these variables using
a 55/45 split. This allocation
corresponds to the ratio of
dividend and interest income
in the 2005 CRA Income
Statistics (Green Book).
CTaCS variable peninc.
Corresponds to line 115 of tax
form.
This is assumed to be non-
taxable income. 
RESULTS
I now present the results from the census. I begin in the first section with an analysis of trends
in different percentiles of the income distribution, comparing across different income measures.
This is followed by examination of two measures of low income, to check the trends at the
bottom of the income distribution. The Gini coefficients for some income measures are then
presented to summarize what is happening across the entire income distribution.
The second section of census results examines the top of the income distribution. I present the
income thresholds and income shares for different income measures and compare the results to
those found in Veall39 and from the recent Statistics Canada release of summary data from the
Longitudinal Administrative Database.
In the final section, I present the results from simulations using the CTaCS tax simulator.
Taking the 2005 distribution of income from the 2006 census, I simulate tax liabilities for all
years between 1962 and 2012 and all provinces. These simulations can help to isolate the
impact of the tax system on the trends observed in the census data.
The income distribution in the Canadian census 1980-2005
To begin the analysis of the income data in the Canadian census, I present in Table 2 the
percentiles of the income distribution taken from various sources. The percentiles range from
the 10th percentile (P10) to the top one-thousandth of the population (P99.9). All data in this
table are from 2005.
TABLE 2: INCOME PERCENTILE CUT-OFFS
Notes: Reported are percentiles of the income distribution in 2005 from various sources. The first seven columns show 
individual income. The last two columns show adjusted after-tax family income.
39 Veal (2010) op. cit.
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P10 3,550 0 843 1,954 19,512 13,464 
P25 11,050 5,541 9,665 10,124 33,252 20,376 
P50 24,250 19,800 22,000 25,000 23,375 22,700 21,219 53,369 30,995 
P75 44,000 44,452 44,312 35,538 79,861 44,670 
P90 69,075 69,000 70,246 70,300 69,462 55,700 53,156 111,942 61,316 
P95 87,500 89,000 90,112 90,100 88,882 69,400 66,489 138,606 75,571 
P99 165,375 174,300 175,000 175,800 170,541 124,300 120,221 247,544 135,631 
P99.9 411,850 656,200 658,015 658,000 609,413 419,800 396,312 786,303 434,161 
Unadjusted Adjusted
SLID CANSIM Census CANSIM Census CANSIM Census Census Census
Market Market Market Total Total After-tax After-tax After-tax After-tax
FAMILIESINDIVIDUALS 
The first column presents income taken from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
(SLID). This survey has been the workhorse of intra-censal income information in Canada. I
use the Public Use Microdata File for the SLID, which contains information on the income and
labour market activities of 53,474 individuals age 16 and over. With the survey weights, the
results aim to be nationally representative. Frenette, Green, and Picot40 examine the SLID and
compare it to tax data and to the census, finding some shortcomings at the bottom of the SLID
income distribution, driven by differences in family sizes and possibly poor coverage of the
lowest-income families in the SLID.
In the next six columns, I show the results from the CANSIM data based on the Longitudinal
Administrative Database (also utilized by Veall41) and compare them to corresponding results
in the census using different definitions of income.42 For the market-income comparisons, I use
a sample similar to Veall,43 which selects only those aged 21 and older. For the census numbers
using total and after-tax individual income, I use everyone age 15 and older.44 The final two
columns of the table show measures of after-tax family income.
For market income, the three sources show remarkably similar numbers through the middle of
the income distribution. At the very top, the SLID shows lower percentile cut-offs, reflecting
the thinness of the sample at very high income levels. (There are fewer than 30 individuals
above P99.9 in the SLID), which underscores the limited utility of the SLID in studying high
incomes. For total income and after-tax income, the census numbers match the CANSIM-LAD
numbers quite closely. As mentioned above, the total and after-tax income measures here for
the census include all individuals age 15 and older, which may include more very low-earning
teenagers than the CANSIM-LAD data. When adjusting for family size in the last column, the
family data also look quite similar to the individual data in the left-hand side of the table.
Overall, the results in Table 2 reveal many similarities, but also some differences relative to the
SLID and the CANSIM-LAD tax-data-based numbers. A number of explanations may underlie
the differences. There could be non-filing of taxes in the tax data or poor coverage in some
income ranges in the SLID. For the census, misreporting of income and survey and item non-
response could explain differences.
To compare the results across time, I graph in Figure 1 the 10th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles
of the income distribution drawn from the census for each year. All income values are adjusted
to 2005 using the CPI. Across the four panels of the table are four different measures of
income, moving from market income pre-tax to family post-tax adjusted income.
40 Frenette, Green, and Picot (2004) op. cit.
41 Veall (2010) op. cit. 
42 The relevant CANSIM table is 204-0001, available at http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/ . 
43 Veall (2010) op. cit. 
44 The difference in samples across the columns of the table accounts for the seemingly odd result that the cut-offs for
total income are lower than for market income. The total income and after-tax income cutoffs include more younger
observations that have lower and zero incomes, which pulls down the cut-offs for those samples.
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FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME, 10TH TO 90TH PERCENTILES
Note: Author’s calculations from 1981 to 2006 master files of the Canadian census. All dollars adjusted to 2005 using CPI.
Each line shows a percentile of income; each of the four panels shows a different measure of income. 
Median individual total pre-tax income fell at the midpoints of the 1980s and 1990s following
recessions. However, since 1995, median income has grown. From 20,038 in 1995, total pre-
tax income has risen to 23,375 by 2005. This growth of 17 per cent exceeded that at the 90th
percentile, which grew 12 per cent to 69,462. In contrast, the income growth for after-tax
income at either the individual or family level was stronger at the 90th percentile than at the
median between 1995 and 2005, reflecting large cuts in top tax rates federally and in many
provinces in and around 2000. 
The ratio of the 90th and 10th percentiles of adjusted family income is log-transformed to arrive
at the log 90-10 ratio. I present this ratio both for pre-tax income and after-tax income in
Figure 2. Pre-tax, the log 90-10 ratio increases from 1.79 to 1.92 log points from 1980 to 1985,
suggesting an increase of about 13 per cent in this ratio. The before-tax ratio stays close to this
level throughout the rest of the available census years. In contrast, the after-tax log 90-10 ratio
declines from 1.63 in 1985 to 1.52 by 2005, a drop of around 12 log points. This provides
some preliminary evidence that, at least in this 10th-to-90th income range, the income tax and
refundable credit system has had a moderating effect on inequality over this time period.45
45 This result contrasts somewhat with Frenette, Green, and Milligan (2007 op. cit.) who find increasing after-tax 90-10
ratios. In comparing the results to that paper, I found that the 90th percentile cut-offs here are quite close, but that the
10th percentile differs somewhat. Given that the income of the 10th percentile depends so heavily on the tax and
transfer system, the 10th percentile cut-off becomes quite sensitive to the method of imputation of taxes and transfers.
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FIGURE 2: LOG OF 90TH AND 10TH PERCENTILES, BEFORE- AND AFTER-TAX ADJUSTED FAMILY INCOME
Note: Author’s calculations from 1981 to 2006 master files of the Canadian census. Each line shows the ratio of two 
percentile cut-offs of income, using different income measures.
Figure 3 breaks down the log 90-10 ratio into two halves: the 90-50 and the 50-10. This
decomposition is useful to start to pinpoint what is happening in the upper and the lower halves
of the income distribution. The top two lines in the figure show movements in the log 50-10
ratio. Pre-tax income ratios seem roughly constant, but for after-tax there is a large drop of 15
log points from 1985 to 2005. In contrast, the log 90-50 ratio in the bottom half of Figure 3
indicates that little of the upward trend in pre-tax income is undone by the tax system. 
FIGURE 3: LOG OF 90TH, 50TH, AND 10TH PERCENTILES, BEFORE- AND AFTER-TAX ADJUSTED FAMILY INCOME
Note: Author’s calculations from 1981 to 2006 master files of the Canadian census. Each line shows the ratio of two 
percentile cut-offs of income, using different income measures.
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The next two figures, Figure 4 and Figure 5, look at two low-income thresholds, the Low-Income
Cut-off (LICO) and the Low-Income Measure (LIM). I graph the percentage of individuals who
live in families under the respective cut-offs. In each case, I supplement my calculations from the
census with the annual survey-based LICO and LIM statistics in the CANSIM database, which
spans 1976 to 2010. For the LICO in Figure 4, the census calculations come in higher than
CANSIM in the 1980s, but from 1990 onward they are quite close. For both the census and
CANSIM measures, LICO by 2005 is at its lowest observed level. For the LIM, the census shows
quite a bit higher LIM rates in the 1980s, but converges to the CANSIM numbers in the 1990s.
Overall, LIM rates have not shown the same downward trajectory in the 1990s that is evident for
the LICO. This reflects increases in the LIM cut-off driven by increasing median family income
since the mid 1990s (as seen in the bottom right panel of Figure 1).
FIGURE 4: PROPORTION UNDER THE LOW INCOME CUT-OFF
Notes: Author’s calculations from 1981 to 2006 Canadian census, and CANSIM Table 202-0283. Each line shows the 
proportion of individuals living in families under the LICO cut-off.
FIGURE 5: PROPORTION UNDER THE LOW-INCOME MEASURE
Notes: Author’s calculations from 1981 to 2006 Canadian census, and CANSIM Table 202-0283. Each line shows the 
proportion of individuals living in families under the LIM cut-off.
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The final figure in this section summarizes the entire distribution in one measure — the Gini
coefficient. I show the results from the census along with those from CANSIM. Figure 6 shows
data from both sources for three different income measures — market income, pre-tax income,
and after-tax income.
FIGURE 6: GINI COEFFICIENTS
Notes: Author’s calculations from 1981 to 2006 Canadian census, and CANSIM Table 202-0709. Each line shows the Gini 
coefficient for a given income measure from one of two data sources.
In the census, both the pre-tax and after-tax measures are rising through time. Before tax, the
Gini coefficient rises from 0.352 in 1980 to 0.404 in 2005; for after-tax the increase is from
0.312 to 0.349. The CANSIM series show a similar trend. Because this measure covers the
entire income distribution, any weakness of the SLID in capturing trends at the very top of the
income distribution will be absent from the CANSIM measure, but will potentially be picked
up by the census.
To summarize the results thus far, pre-tax incomes at many parts of the income distribution
showed some growth between 1995 and 2005, but there were sharp differences in the top and
bottom halves. On an after-tax basis, the growth in incomes was larger closer to the top than in
the middle. The bottom of the income distribution also gained on the middle, mostly driven by
the tax system and not pre-tax income differences.
Census data on top incomes
The next results focus attention on the top of the income distribution. Saez and Veall46 and
Veall47 have laid out a clear set of results for income shares at the top using tax data. Here, I
provide analogous calculations using census data. The census data allow formation of
economic family units, and also incorporate transfer income in addition to the market income
studied by Veall.
46 Saez and Veall (2005) op. cit. 
47 Veall (2010) op. cit.; (2012) op. cit. 
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The four panels in Figure 7 show income percentile cut-offs for the 95th, 99th, and 99.9th
percentiles for four different measures of income. For all four measures of income, there is a
sharp change in 1995. In particular, the income threshold to reach the 99.9th percentile
explodes. In market income, this increase is 81 per cent; for adjusted after-tax family income it
is 106 per cent. For the 99th percentile there is still substantial growth of 25 per cent pre-tax
and even more after tax.
FIGURE 7: PERCENTILE INCOME CUT-OFFS NEAR THE TOP
Notes: Author’s calculations from 1981 to 2006 Canadian census; incomes in 2005 dollars. Each line shows a different 
percentile cut-off. The four panels display the results for different income measures.
For individual market income, the numbers here in the census can be compared to Veall.48 For
example, in 1995, Veall finds market income (in 2005 dollars) of 78,363 at the 95th percentile,
137,247 at the 99th, and 385,396 at the 99.9th. Thus, the census does not capture as much
income at the very top, but does better at the 95th percentile. As here, Veall49 finds a large
increase in top income thresholds between 1995 and 2005. 
The next figure shows the top income shares. Figure 8 has the same four measures of income
as the previous figure, and also displays results for the 99th and 99.9th percentile. I also show
the income share of those between the 95th and 99th percentile. All four measures of income
show similar patterns. There is little change in the income share of those in between the 95th
and 99th percentiles. Income for those in the top one per cent grows sharply after 1995, and for
48 Veall (2010) op. cit. 
49 Ibid.
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those in the top 0.1 per cent it grows even more sharply. The total income share of the top one
per cent for total income goes from 7.8 per cent to 11 per cent between 1995 and 2005. Of this
3.2-per cent increase, 61 per cent comes from those in the top 10th of the group — those with
incomes above the 99.9th percentile. While the level of the top income shares for after-tax
family income is smaller, the percentage growth at the top is even larger than for market
income or total pre-tax income.
FIGURE 8: TOP INCOME SHARES
Notes: Author’s calculations from 1981 to 2006 Canadian census. Each line shows a different percentile cut-off. The four 
panels display the results for different income measures. 
Veall50 reports that the income share of the top one per cent rose from 7.9 per cent in 1985 to
13.2 per cent in 2005. It appears that the census finds the top one per cent share to be about 1.3
percentage points less than the tax data. Overall, however, the results presented here confirm
that the trends uncovered by Veall can be reproduced in the census data and are not reversed by
adjusting for taxes or family considerations.
The results of the income distribution analysis in the census for 1980 to 2005 are summarized
in Table 3. For each of the several measures, I take the value in 1980 and in 2005, and compare
the change before taxes to the change after taxes. This allows a calculation of how much of the
increase in pre-tax inequality was undone by the tax system. 
50 Veall (2010) op. cit. 
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Individual Market Pre−Tax Income
0.1398 0.1360 0.1301 0.1328 0.1366 0.1340
0.0791 0.0788 0.0762 0.0780
0.0901
0.1100
0.0190 0.0201 0.0196 0.0206 0.0273
0.0401
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Individual Total Pre−Tax Income
0.1273 0.1245 0.1163 0.1166 0.1183 0.1214
0.0638 0.0655 0.0642 0.0634
0.0735
0.0907
0.0139 0.0158 0.0160 0.0161 0.0213
0.0321
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Individual Post−Tax Income
0.0707 0.0737 0.0700 0.0692 0.0698 0.0714
0.0356 0.0382 0.0369 0.0362
0.0425
0.0539
0.0081 0.0094 0.0095 0.0091 0.0122
0.0188
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TABLE 3: CHANGES FROM 1980 TO 2005 AND IMPACT OF TAX SYSTEM
Notes: Each row shows the value of an inequality measure in 1980 and 2005 and the change between those dates. The 
last column shows how much of the pre-tax change was undone by the tax system, calculated as one minus the post-
tax change divided by the pre-tax change.
The first row shows the Gini coefficient for after-tax adjusted family income. The pre-tax
change was 0.052, but post-tax it was only 0.037. This suggests that 28.7 per cent of the
increase was undone by the tax system. Interestingly, there are large differences between the
first and second halves of this time period. Between 1980 and 1995, the tax system undid 57
per cent of the change in the coefficient, but from 1995 to 2005 the tax system only undid two
per cent of the rise in the coefficient. For the log 90-10 ratio of after-tax family income, the tax
system more than undid the rise in pre-tax inequality. That is, as pre-tax income inequality rose
by this measure, the tax system undid those increases and also pushed this measure further
toward equality. This was mostly a result of large increases at the bottom of the distribution, as
the P90-P50 shows much less change in the after-tax ratios than the P50-P10.
For the P90-P50 ratio, the proportion of the pre-tax increase that was undone by the tax system
is 22.4 per cent. However, there are great differences when looking within the 1980 to 1995
time period compared to the 1995 to 2005 time period. During the first 15-year period, the
P90-P50 ratio increased by 4.9 points, but 71 per cent of this was undone by the tax system. In
contrast, the further 2.3-point increase from 1995 to 2005 was not undone. In fact, the P90-P50
after-tax income ratio increased by 4.2 points, meaning that the tax system reinforced the
increase in pre-tax income disparities over this time period. This result echoes the findings of
Frenette, Green, and Milligan,51 who found that the pre-tax rise in income inequality in the
1980s was undone by the tax system, but the similar rise in the 1990s was not. From 1995
onward, the Canadian income tax system became less redistributive.
The last two rows of Table 3 show the top one per cent and top 0.1 per cent shares of
individual total pre-tax income. The tax system undid only around 13 per cent of the large
increases in pre-tax inequality at the very top. This result is important — it is possible that the
rise in pre-tax income concentration at the top of the income distribution could have been
substantially undone by a strongly progressive income tax. However, this does not appear to be
the case for Canada over this time period, as only around an eighth of the increase in pre-tax
concentration in the top one per cent was undone by the tax system.
51 Frenette, Green, and Milligan (2007) op. cit. 
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Gini 0.352 0.312 0.404 0.349 0.052 0.037 28.7%
P90-P10 1.786 1.534 1.948 1.516 0.162 -0.018 111.3%
P90-P50 0.697 0.626 0.769 0.682 0.072 0.056 22.4%
P50-P10 1.089 0.908 1.179 0.834 0.090 -0.074 182.5%
Top 1% share 0.079 0.064 0.110 0.091 0.031 0.027 13.2%
Top 0.1% share 0.019 0.014 0.040 0.032 0.021 0.018 13.8% 
Pre-tax Post-tax Pre-tax Post-tax Pre-tax Post-tax % 
1980 2005 Change Undone
Simulations across years and provinces
To provide some more insight into what is driving the trends observed in the census data, I
now present the results of some simulations performed with the CTaCS calculator. For these
simulations, I take the observations from the 2006 census and run them and their observed pre-
tax income through the tax calculator for different years and provinces. To save on computing
time, I do this with a random 10 per cent sample of households. I first run simulations by
varying the year, trying each year between 1962 and 2012. I follow that with some simulations
by province, showing all provinces and territories for the 2012 tax year.
The first simulations are shown in Figure 9, which shows the results of the log 90-10, 90-50,
and 50-10 ratios for adjusted after-tax family income. At the top of the figure, the results for
the log 90-10 ratio show a striking contrast when refundable tax credits are netted out and
when they are not. Without including refundable tax credits, the log 90-10 ratio is fairly flat
through time. However, with the refundable tax credits included, there is a marked drop in the
log 90-10 ratio of 30 log points, which is very large. The 90-50 and 50-10 analysis lower down
in Figure 9 reveal that all of the effect is driven by the lower half of the income distribution.
This is sensible, since refundable tax credits have a much larger impact on that part of the
income distribution.
FIGURE 9: LOG PERCENTILE RATIOS USING SIMULATED AFTER-TAX ADJUSTED FAMILY INCOMES, 1962-2012
Notes: Author’s calculations using the CTaCS simulator and income distribution from 2006 census. Each line shows the 
ratio of two percentile cut-offs of income, using different income measures. The ‘Gross’ series do not subtract 
refundable credits; the ‘Net’ series do.
Figure 10 shows the proportion of families under the LICO and households under the LIM.
The LICO declines substantially after 2000, again reflecting improvements in refundable tax
credits at this time. From a rate of 13.3 per cent in 2000, the simulated LICO falls to 10.7 per
cent by 2012, for a drop of 20 per cent. The LIM shows a similar trajectory. To be clear, these
policy-related results reflect changes in how income taxes and refundable tax credits affect
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LICO and LIM rates, holding pre-tax income constant. Chen and Corak52 find that other
aspects of government transfers which affect pre-tax incomes — such as Employment
Insurance and social assistance — have made low income rates for families with children
worse since the 1990s.
FIGURE 10: SIMULATED LICO AND LIM, 1962-2012
Notes: Author’s calculations using the CTaCS simulator and income distribution from 2006 census. Each line shows the 
simulated proportion of individuals living in families under the given low-income cut-off for each year.
Finally, Figure 11 examines how much of the change in the after-tax top income shares
observed earlier can be attributed directly to the tax system. Here, I revert to individual after-
tax income shares. While there is an increase of around 1.5 percentage points in the top one per
cent share in the 1970s, the top one per cent share stays fairly constant after that point. This
suggests that the tax system has not been a large contributor to the increases in after-tax
income shares over this period. Instead, it is the pre-tax shifts that have driven the increasing
concentration of income at the top.
52 Chen, Wen-Hao and Miles Corak (2005), “Child Poverty and Changes in Child Poverty in Rich Countries since
1990,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 1574.
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FIGURE 11: SIMULATED TOP INCOME SHARES, 1962-2012
Notes: Author’s calculations using the CTaCS simulator and income distribution from 2006 census. Each line shows a 
different percentile cut-off for simulated income in each year.
The last two figures examine inequality measures across the provinces and territories in 2012.
Figure 12 displays the log 90-10 ratio. Among the provinces, Alberta is the highest at 1.503
and Quebec is the lowest at 1.280 — Quebec is a strong outlier. In a breakdown into the 90-50
and 50-10 ratios (not shown here), Quebec’s performance is equally an outlier in both halves of
the income distribution. Figure 13 closes the analysis by showing how the top one per cent
income share would vary if all Canadians lived in different provinces and territories. Alberta
again leads the way at 9.4 per cent, with Quebec the lowest at 8.6 per cent. Nova Scotia’s
introduction of a high-income bracket at 150,000 allows it to come close to Quebec at 8.7 per
cent income share for the top one per cent. These results show noticeable differences across
provinces.
FIGURE 12: LOG 90-10 RATIOS, SIMULATED PROVINCIAL AFTER-TAX ADJUSTED FAMILY INCOME
Notes: Author’s calculations using the CTaCS simulator and income distribution from 2006 census and tax parameters from 
the 2012 tax year. Each bar shows the log of the 90th and 10th percentile cut-off ratio for a given province using a 
common income distribution for all provinces.
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FIGURE 13: TOP 1% INCOME SHARE SIMULATED AFTER-TAX INDIVIDUAL INCOME
Notes: Author’s calculations using the CTaCS simulator and income distribution from 2006 census and tax parameters from 
the 2012 tax year. Each bar shows the proportion of income in the top one per cent for a given province using a 
common income distribution for all provinces. 
These simulations have revealed several interesting influences of income tax policy. The
simulations emphasized the importance of the refundable tax credits at the bottom part of the
distribution in making the tax system — by some measures — less unequal over the last 20
years. In contrast, the income tax system has not had a large impact on the after-tax income
share of the top one per cent of income earners. Finally, provincial differences are quite large,
reflecting the large degree of autonomy provinces have over the rates, brackets, and refundable
credits in their income tax systems.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the distribution of before- and after-tax income in Canada using a
time series of six Canadian censuses from 1980 to 2005. To a large degree, the results
presented here echo those of the literature using administrative tax data. There has been a large
increase in the before-tax incomes of those at the top of the income distribution. This increase
has pulled up the income share of top earners relative to others, and this result holds even after
accounting for all sources of income, income taxes, and the complete family situation. 
In addition to confirming and extending the results of the previous literature for high-income
concentration, this paper provides new results that reveal the importance of tax policy in
understanding the trends in after-tax income inequality. While the tax system undid much of
the increase in pre-tax income inequality in the earlier part of the study period, since 1995, the
tax system has not kept pace with the rise in pre-tax inequality. The expansion of refundable
tax credits to those in the bottom half of the income distribution has been very important. For
some inequality measures, such as the log 90-10 ratio and the LICO, the expansion of
refundable tax credits has led to a significant reduction of inequality over the last 25 years. In
particular, the expansion of refundable tax credits in the late 1990s had a large impact, cutting
the proportion of people under LICO by 20 per cent.
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